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ARBITRATION AND THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934: THE PROSPECT OF
EXTENDING WILKO v. SWAN
The United States Arbitration Act' renders written provisions
for arbitration of future disputes in any maritime transaction or a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce "valid, irrevocable and enforceable."' Arbitration,3 although historically
viewed with hostility, 4 now enjoys a reputation as a valid and bind-

'

9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
See id. at § 2:

A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out
of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing contract,
transaction, or refusal shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon grounds
that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
Id.

* Arbitration has been defined as:
[A] contractual proceeding whereby the parties to any controversy or dispute, in
order to obtain an inexpensive and speedy final disposition of the matter involved,
select judges of their own choice and by consent submit their controversy to such
judge for determination, in the place of tribunals provided by the ordinary processes
of law.
Gates v. Arizona Brewing Co., 4 Ariz. 266, 269, 95 P.2d 49, 50 (1939). See also M. DOMKE,
DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBrrRATION, § 1:01 (rev. ed. 1983 & 1985 Supp.), at 1, defining
arbitration as a voluntary process for settlement of disputes by which a third person of the
parties choice hands down a final and binding award.
4 English Common Law courts were opposed to non-judicial forums, including arbitration, viewing such forums as contravening public policy by ousting courts of jurisdiction.
See Kulukundis Shipping Co., [S/A] v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983-85 (2d
Cir. 1942). See also L FULLER & M. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAw 432-33 (4th ed. 1981);
5 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 356-60 (1959); Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law,
37 YALE L.J. 595, 610 (1928) (hostility originated "in context of the courts of ancient times
for extension of jurisdiction"). This common law hostility can be traced back to the 15th
Century. See Y.B. Mich. 8 Edw. 4, f. 9b,10a, pl. 9 (1468); Y.B. Trin. 5 Edw. 4, f. 3b, pl. 2
(1465); Y.B. Pasch. 28 Hen. 6, f. 6, pl. 4 (1449).
The early American courts also evinced a hostility towards arbitration. See Red Cross
Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120-21 (1924) ("The Federal courts - like those of
the states and of England - have, both in equity and at law, denied, in large measure, the
aid of their processes to those seeking to enforce executory agreements to arbitrate
disputes.")
For further discussion of the historical context of arbitration, see Emerson, History of
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ing alternative to formal court litigation.
Although there are a few basic similarities between arbitration
and formal court proceedings, arbitration differs in at least three
significant aspects. First, arbitrators do not have to apply substantive or procedural rules of law. Second, arbitrators are not required to issue written opinions stating reasons for their awards.'
Third, decisions by arbitrators on the merits are not reviewable
by the courts.'
It is generally agreed that the purposes of arbitration are to reduce cost,' ease court congestion1" and expedite settlements of
Arbitration Practice and Law, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 155 (1970); Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REv. 132 (1934); Note, Arbitrability of Disputes
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 71 IowA L. REV. 1137, 1139 (1986) (citing F. KELLOR,
AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS AND ACHIEVEMENTS (1948)).

' See generally Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) ("Congress declared a
national policy favoring arbitration by enacting the Arbitration Act"); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (enactment of Arbitration
Act evidence of congressional declaration of federal policy favoring arbitration); Prima
-Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967) (in enacting Arbitration
Act Congress' purpose was to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other agreements); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953) (Act establishes desirability of arbitration
as alternative to complications of litigation). See also M. DoMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1-3 (1968); Burger, Isn't There A Better Way, 68 A.B.A. J. 274
(1982).
1 Joseph P. Cuddigan, Inc. v. Dimes Constr. Co., 106 R.I. 583, 586, 261 A.2d 850, 852
(1970) (award will be upheld regardless of mistake of law by arbitor); Dane v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 369 Mass. 966, 967, 341 N.E.2d 254, 254 (1976) (in absence of fraud, arbitrator's
award will not be vacated because of error of law).
I See Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 244, n.4 (1962) ("arbitrators have
no obligation to give reasons for their award"); United States Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960) (record of proceeding need not be
as complete as in trial court); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953) ("award may be
made without explanation and without a complete record of [the] proceeding . ..").
8 See University of Alaska v. Modern Constr. Inc., 522 P.2d 1132, 1139 (Alaska 1974)
(award is presumed valid and will be upheld without court looking into merits of case);
Joseph P. Cuddigan Inc. v. Dimes Constr. Co., 106 R.I. 583, 586, 261 A.2d 850, 852
(1970) (ambiguities within an opinion is not reason in itself for court to invalidate award).
I See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 431-32 ("reports of Congress indicate the need for
avoiding the expense of litigation"); Conticommodity Services Inc. v. Philipp & Lion, 613
F.2d 1222, 1224 (2d Cir. 1980) (Congress intended to provide relatively inexpensive alternative to trial). See also H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2 (1923), stating that:
[ilt is practically appropriate that the action should be taken at this time when there
is so much agitation against the costliness and delays of litigation. These matters can
be largely eliminated by agreements for arbitration, if arbitration agreements are
made valid and enforceable.
Id.
But see Kronstein, Business Arbitration-Instrument of Private Government. 54 YALE L.J. 36,
39 n.10 (1944) (questioning the assumption that arbitration is less expensive than judicial
settlement); Kritzer & Anderson, The Arbitration Alternative: A Comparitive Analysis of Case
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disputes. 1 One problem concerning the validity of arbitration
arises in a context when there are countervailing public policy
considerations inherent in another statute12 - specifically, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.'s
The Act of 1934 was not meant to change or alter the basic
purposes behind its predecessor, the Securities Act of 1933.'4
More specifically, Congress intended to "eliminate deceptive and
unfair practices in security trading to protect the public from inaccurate, incomplete and misleading information," thus giving the
investing public the opportunity "to make knowing and intelligent
decisions regarding the purchase and sale of securities."' 8
The actual conflict between the Federal Arbitration Act and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 surfaces upon the reading of
the non-waiver provision of the Securities Exchange Act, which
provides "[a]ny condition, stipulation or provision binding any
person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter...
Processing Time, Disposition Mode, and Cost in the American Arbitration Association and the
Courts, 8 JusT. Sys. J. 6 (1983) (arbitration is not always less expensive than litigation because arbitration is more likely than litigation to proceed to adjudicated conclusion).
" See Gait v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 376 F.2d 711, 714 (7th Cir. 1967) (policy
underlying enactment of Arbitration Act is easing of court congestion). See also, Burger,
supra note 5, at 277 ("[it] is now clear that neither the federal nor the state court systems
are capable of handling all the burdens placed upon them").
" See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 431-32 (need for avoiding the delay associated with
litigation); Radiator Specialty Co. v. Cannon Mills Inc., 97 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir. 1938)
("arbitration laws are passed to expedite and facilitate settlement of disputes ..
"); Cargo
Carriers Inc. v. Erie & St. Lawrence Corp., 105 F. Supp. 638, 639 (W.D.N.Y. 1952).
"s See generally Note, Arbitration Agreements and Antitrust Claims: The Need For Enhanced
Accomodation of Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C.L. REv. 219 (1986) (discussing conflicting
purposes of arbitration as they relate to antitrust laws' reliance on private enforcement as
essential means to secure competitive markets).
", Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk
(1982)).
"4See HR. REP. No. 94, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 91 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws, Legislative History 97, 97, stating:
The basic goals of the Exchange Act remains salutatory and unchallenged: To provide fair and honest mechanisms for pricing of securities, to assure that dealing in
securities is fair and without undue preferences or advantages among investors, to
ensure that securities can be purchased and sold at economically efficient transaction
costs, and to provide to the maximum degree practicable, markets that are open and
orderly....
Id.
I&Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 538 F.2d 532, 539 (3d Cir.
1976) (Stern, J., dissenting) (citing Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173 (3d Cir. 1970)),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976).
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shall be void." 1
This article will trace the applicable case law beginning with the
watershed case of Wilko v. Swan, 17 invalidating an arbitration
agreement under the Securities Act of 1933, to McMahon v. Shearson /American Express, Inc.,18 now pending before the United
States Supreme Court. In addition, this article will suggest that
the Supreme Court, in the McMahon case"' should extend their
decision in Wilko2" to cases arising under the 1934 Act an:i hold
that fraud violations arising under the Act of 1934 are nonarbitrable.

I.

DEVELOPMENT OF APPLICABLE CASE LAW

A. Wilko v. Swan
In Wilko v. Swan,' 1 the plaintiff, a purchaser of securities,'2 entered a margin agreement with the defendant (broker).' 3 By this
agreement, the parties were to submit all future disputes arising
under the contract to arbitration.u Alleging that the broker had
induced him to purchase the securities by false representation, 5
16Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 29(a) (1934) (codified as amended in 15
U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1982)).
" 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
" Id.
10 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953).
21 346 U.S. 427.
22 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 428-29 (1953). On January 17, 1951, Anthony Wilko
purchased from Hayden, Stone & Co., 1600 shares of Air Associates, Inc. for the sum of
$29,517.54. Id. at 429. See also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 522 (Douglas,
J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, White & Marshall, JJ.) (citing the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, § 3(aXO)), (defining a security as including any "note, stock, treasury stock,
bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any
profit sharing agreement . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1982)).
2' Wilko, 346 U.S. at 429. The margin agreement, or the contract for the purchase and
sale of securities, provided in part that the parties' relationship was controlled by the terms
of the agreements. Id.
24 Id. at 432 n.15. "Any controversy arising between us under this contract shall be determined by arbitration." Id.
" Wilko, 107 F. Supp at 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). The plaintiff alleged that the defendants
falsely represented to him that Air Associates Inc. had merged with Borg Warner Corp.,
that as a result the stock value would increase and as evidence of this lending institutions
and large financial interests were purchasing the stocks. Id. Additionally, the plaintiff
charged that defendant Haven B. Page, owner of a block of stock of the Air Associates
Inc., was at that time selling his stock "including aome or all of the stock sold to the plaintiff." Id.
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Wilko filed suit in federal court to recover damages 26 for a violation of section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.3
Pursuant to section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act,2 8 the broker moved to stay the action pending arbitration, but the district
court denied the motion.3 0 The court of appeals held the Securities Act did not preclude arbitration and reversed the lower
court, 1 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari3 2 to review the
question of "whether an agreement to arbitrate a future controversy is a 'condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person
acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision' of
"Id.

at 75. The plaintiff sought to recover $3,888.88 in damages. Id. at 76.
" Wilko, 107 F. Supp. at 77. Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. Section 771 provides in part that "[alny person who . . . sells a security . . . by means of a
prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact..
. shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him .... " Securities Act of
1933, ch. 38, § 12(2), 48 Stat. 74, 84 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. 771 (1982)).
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982) states in pertinent part:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon
any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration,
the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved
in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall
on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration
has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.

Id.
See Portland Constr. Co. v. Weiss Pollution Control Corp., 532 F.2d 1009, 1013 (5th Cir.
1976) (expedite arbitration and ease court congestion); New Process Steel Corp. v. Titan
Indus. Corp., 555 F. Supp. 1018 (S.D. Tex. 1983). The purpose of section 3 is to permit
selection of an alternative to expensive litigation and to proceed in the alternative without
court imposed delays. Id. See also Parcel Tankers, Inc. v. Formosa Plastics Corp., 569 F.
Supp. 1459 (D.C. Tex. 1983) (alternative to costly litigation without delay imposed on
courts).
" Wilko, 346 U.S. at 429. Defendant moved to stay this action and all other actions until
arbitration in accordance with the terms of the margin agreement could be had. Id.
IId. at 430. In denying the defendant's motion to stay the action, the district court
stated that congressional intent required the provisions of the Securities Act to be strictly
complied with in order to protect the investor, and therefore the controversy was not "referable to arbitration." Wilko v. Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (quoting Federal
Arbitration Statute § 3, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982)).
"I Wilko, 346 U.S. at 430. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that "[t]he
purpose of that Act was deliberately to alter the judicial atmosphere previously existing,"
and "[iln the light of the clear intention of Congress, it is our obligation to shake off the
old judicial hostility to arbitration." Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir. 1953) (quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942)).
The Second Circuit could not find congressional intention to proscribe arbitration of a
dispute arising under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933. Wilko, 201 F.2d at 445.
n Wilko v. Swan, 345 U.S. 969 (1953).
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the Securities Act which Section 14 declares 'void'.''ss
Justice Reed, delivering the opinion of the Court, stated that
because the margin agreement "evidenced a transaction in interstate commerce,"" and one of the policies of the Arbitration Act
is the desire to avoid the delay and expense of litigation," the
Arbitration Act applied." However, the Court also realized the
countervailing provision of the Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2)'1,
which granted a "special right" to the investor to recover for misrepresentation.' This "special right" to recover was enforceable
in any federal or state court of competent jurisdiction.8 ' The
Court stated that this "special right" was granted to safeguard the
securities purchaser from the "disadvantages under which buyers
labor.140 Applying the Securities Act of 1933, the Court held the
" Id. at 430. Securities Exchange Act of 1933, ch. 38 § 14, 48 Stat. 84 (codified as
amended in 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982)) provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision
binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this
subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void." Id.
" 346 U.S. at 430.
U See Wilk, 346 U.S. at 431-32 (need for avoiding delay associated with litigation); Conticommodity Services, Inc. v. Philipp & Lion, 613 F.2d 1222, 1224 (2d Cir. 1980) (Congress
intended to provide inexpensive alternative to trial); Radiator Specialty Co. v. Cannon
Mills, Inc., 97 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir. 1938) (arbitration laws are passed to expedite and
facilitate settlement of disputes). See also HR. RE'. No. 96, 68th Cong., Ist
Sess., at 2 (1923)
(arbitration can eliminate the costliness and delays of litigation).
" Wilko, 346 U.S. at 430.
8 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 12, 48 Stat. 84 (1933) (codified as amended in 15
U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982)). Section 771(2) provides:
Any person who offers or sells a security... by the use of any means or instruments of transportation
or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus
or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or
omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser
not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of
proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of such truth or omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either in law or in equity .
Id.

" Wilko, 346 U.S. at 430-31. The Securities Act demands that issuers and dealers make
full and fair disclosure of the character of the securities to the investor. Id. at 431. Section
12(2) places the burden of proof of lack of scienter on the seller. Id.; H.R. REP. No. 85, 73rd
Cong., IstSess. at 9-10 (1933).
" Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431; see Wilko, 107 F. Supp. at 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (quoting Securites
Exchange Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 12, 48 Stat. 84 (1933) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §

771(2) (1982)).
" Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435; see Otis & Co. v. SEC. 106 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1939) noting that
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agreement to arbitrate was a "stipulation" waiving compliance
with a "provision" of the Act, 41 namely, the right to select a judicial forum." The majority stated that although the policies of the
Securities and Arbitration Acts were not easily reconcilable, congressional intention was best served by invalidation of the agreement to arbitrate future claims arising under the Act."
It is submitted that the decision in Wilko v. Swan should be extended to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to hold that fraud
violations are non-arbitrable.
B.

Treatment of Wilko v. Swan
In what first appeared to preclude an extension of the holding

in Wilko4" to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Supreme
Court in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.," held claims pursuant to Sec-

tion 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,46 arising under
an international agreement, arbitrable.4 7 In Scherk,4" an American

firm purchased a German citizen's related businesses and trade"[tlhis statute should be so construed as to achieve the purpose of its enactment if its langauge is susceptible of such a construction. The obvious purpose of the Congress in its
enactment was protection of the investing public." Id. See also Oklahoma Texas Trust v.
SEC, 100 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir. 1939) (purpose of Act is to protect investor from fraud in
sale of securities).
" Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-35.
,Id. See Note, Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements in FraudActions Under the Securities
Act, 62 YALE L.J. 985, 987 (1953); Securities Acts - Federal SecuritiesAct -Arbitration Clause
in Brokerage Agreement Precludes Purchaser'sStatutory Suit for Misrepresentation,66 HARV.L
REv. 1326, 1327 (1953). Cf Boyd v. Grand Trunk W. R. Co., 338 U.S. 263 (1949) (holding
that an agreement limiting choice of venue void as in direct conflict with Employer's Liability Act).
" Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438; see Wilko v. Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (intent
of Congress that Securities Act provisions should be strictly complied with); Otis & Co. v.
SEC, 106 F.2d 579, 583 (6th Cir. 1939) (Congress' intention was to protect public and statute should be construed to achieve this purpose); see also S. REP. No. 47, 73rd Cong., Ist
Sess. 2 (1933); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73rd Cong. IstSess., 9-10 (1933).
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
' Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 891 (1934) (codified as
amended in 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982)).
" Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519-20; see Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am. Inc., 350 U.S.
198 (1956). The United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-3, pursuant to § 2, makes
"valid, irrevocable and enforceable" contracts relating to a maritime transaction and those
involving commerce. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 200; see also The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1972) (international contract clause stipulating forum in which to
litigate should be given "full effect" when both parties voluntarily entered into agreement).
'" Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).

Arbitration and Securities
mark rights." The purchase agreement called for arbitration of
disputes arising out of the transaction." In a subsequent dispute,
Alberto-Culver Co. filed suit in federal court alleging violations of
section 10(b).51 Relying on Wilko," the district court denied
Scherk's motion to stay the action pending arbitration, and
granted plaintiff's motion to enjoin the defendant from proceeding with arbitration. Reversing the court of appeals affirmation,
the Supreme Court held that "the provisions of the Arbitration
Act cannot be ignored in this case."" In distinguishing this case
from Wilko,55 the Court focused on the "truly international" nature of the agreement in Scherk," as compared to the strictly domestic agreement in Wilko.57 The Court stated that when an
41 Scherk, 417 U.S. at 508. The plaintiff, Alberto-Culver Co., incorporated in Delaware,
manufactured and distributed toiletries; the defendant, Scherk, a German citizen, was the
owner of three interrelated businesses which manufactured toiletries and licensed trademarks for these products. Id. Scherk's businesses were organized under the laws of Germany and Leichtenstein. Id. In 1969 an agreement was signed providing for the transfer of
ownership of Scherk's business together with all rights to trademarks in cosmetics. Scherk
warranted that the trademarks were solely owned by him and unencumbered. Id.

"Id.
01 Scherk, 417 U.S. at 509. Approximately one year after closing the transaction in 1969,
Alberto-Culver Co. discovered substantial encumberances on the trademark rights it had
purchased from Scherk. Id. After Scherk refused to rescind the contract, Alberto-Culver
Co. instituted an action in Federal District Court. Id. The plaintiff alleged that Scherk
made fraudulent misrepresentations in the sale of the trademark rights and that this was a
violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id.
" Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
" Scherk, 417 U.S. at 510.
" Scherk, 417 U.S. at 513. The Court stated that a "colorable argument" could be made
that the reasoning of Wilko did not hold in Scherk, noting that the 1933 Act established an
express private remedy for civil liability while the remedy of the 1934 Act is implied. Id.
Additionally, the 1934 Act narrows selection of venue and provides for an action only in
federal district court. Id. at 513-14.
" Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
- Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515.
Id. at 515-16. "A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce an internaI7
tional arbitration agreement would not only frustrate these purposes, but would invite unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to secure tactical litigation advantages." Id. at 516-17. See also Quigley, Accession By the United States to the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049,
1059-60 (1961) (the United Nations Economic and Social Council adopted Convention on
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in 1958). In 1970 the United
States acceded to the treaty. Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in 1958, 1970, 3 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997. Subsequently, Congress
passed Chapter 2 of the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., to implement
the provision of the Convention. Chapter 1 of 7 U.S.C. § 201 provides that the Convention
"shall be enforced in United States courts in accordance with this chapter." See Scherk, 417
U.S. at 520 n.15. The purpose of the Convention and primary purpose of the United States
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agreement involves international transactions, selecting "in advance the forum in which disputes shall be litigated and the law to
be applied is

. .

.an almost indispensible precondition to achieve-

ment of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international business transaction.""M Therefore, because of a need to
promote international trade and foster a willingness on the part of
businessmen to enter international agreements, the Court distinguished this case on its facts from Wilko,51 and held that the dispute be settled by arbitration."
It became apparent that Wilko 61 still had life in regard to the
1934 Act e2 in Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.," a
when the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, applying the
Wilko rule," held the buyer-employee's claims arising under the
1934 Act" non-arbitrable." The court rejected defendant's conadopting it was to "encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration
agreements in international contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements to
arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries." Id. Cf
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). The dispute in Wilko arose under a purely domestic
transaction, and no international conflict of laws problem could have arisen. Scherk, 417
U.S. at 515-16.
s Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516. "The elimination of all such uncertainties by agreeing in
advance on a forum acceptable to both parties is an indispensible element in international
trade, commerce, and contracting." Id. at 518 (quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972)).
" Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
" Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519-20.
*1 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
a 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.
O Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.), Cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976). The plaintiff (Ayres) was an employee of the defendant. Id. at
533. He had a stock option agreement with Merrill Lynch which provided a cash out upon
retirement. Id. The defendant did not disclose to Ayres its intention of going public with
its stock. Id. at 533-34. Ayres decided to retire and cash out his stock with defendant, a
total value of $209,064. Id. at 534. Subsequently, defendant corporation went public, and
plaintiff sought recission of the sale or damages based on a § 10(b) violation - non-disclosure of a material fact. Id. The plaintiff alleged that had this information been disclosed to
him, he would not have retired and cashed out, and would have realized a gain from the
corporation going public. Id.
e"Ayres, 538 F.2d at 536. "The Supreme Court held that the anti-waiver provision of
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. Section 77n .... rendered void a prospective agreement between a brokerage firm and a customer which would have required arbitration of
the customer's claim under Section 72(2) of the 1933 Act." Id.
" Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404 § 29(a), 48 Stat. 881, 903 (1934) (codified as
amended in 15 U.S.C. § 78(cXa) (1982)).
Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976). The Ayres court rejected the dictum in Scherk that mentioned a
"colorable argument can be made" that Wilko would not be applicable to the 1934 Act.
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tention that Scherk67 restricted application of Wilko" to the 1933
Act."" Indeed, the Ayres court noted that Congress appears to
have accepted the view that the buyer's "special right," outlined
71
in Wilko, 70 also applies to the 1934 Act "in the 10(b) context.
The court also refused to distinguish Ayres 7 ' because of "differences between the rights granted in the 1933 and 1934 Acts or
73
any consideration of policy."
In its first opportunity after Ayres7 4 to extend the Wilko"8 holding to the 1934 Act, the Supreme Court did not reach the specific
issue; rather it held, in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,7 that
pendent state claims are arbitrable. 7 7 However, the Court, in discussing Wilko, 7 8 did conclude that the case still "retained consider79
able vitality."
In 1985 the Court dealt with an analogous issue of enforceabilAyres, 538 F.2d at 536 (citing Scherk, 417 U.S. at 513-14). A Section 10(b) cause of action
under the 1934 Act is judicially implied whereas a Section 12(2) cause of action under the
1933 Act is express. Ayres, 538 F.2d at 536 n.12.
0 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
U Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
" Ayres, 538 F.2d at 536.
70 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427.
71 Ayres, 538 F.2d at 536. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. Ill,
reprinted in 1975. U.S. CODE & ADMIN. NEws 331, 342. When amending section 28 of the 1934
Act, which deals with arbitration proceedings between self-regulatory organizations and
their members, Congress recognized that this amendment did not, and should not,
"change existing law, as articulated in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), concerning the
effect of arbitration proceeding provisions in agreements entered into by persons dealing
with members and participants of self-regulatory organizations." Id. In effect, the arbitration agreements are binding on the member firms, but not on the individual investors.
" Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.), crt.
denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976).
7'
Ayres, 538 F.2d at 536.
" Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1976).
'* Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
470 U.S. 213 (1985). Byrd invested $160,000 in securities through Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. In a one year period the account declined more than $100,000. In his suit, Byrd
alleged that Dean Witter traded in his account without consent, churned the account, and
made misrepresentations to him about the status of his account. Id. at 214. Since the securities broker only sought to compel arbitration of the pendent state claims, and not the
federal claims, the Court declined to reach the issue of whether or not Section 10(b) claims
are arbitrable under the 1934 Act. Id. at 216, n.1.
" Id. at 217. The Court stated that the "(airbitration Act requires district courts to
compel arbitration of pendent arbitrable claims when one of the parties files a motion to
compel ..... Id.
78 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 427.
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 216 n.1 (1985).
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ity of arbitration agreements relating to disputes arising under the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act.80 In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 1 the Court held that the arbitration clause
in the agreement between the parties included claims arising
under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.8 ' These claims were held to
be arbitrable despite the court of appeals uniform characterization of the claims as "inappropriate for enforcement by arbitration." 83 Due to the international transaction involved in Mitsubishi," the Court relied on Scherk8" in reaching its decision to
arbitrate the anti-trust claim. 86 Although the Court upheld the
provisions and policies of the Arbitration Act,87 it stated that "it is
the Congressional intention expressed in some other statute on
which the courts must rely to identify any category of claims as to
which agreements to arbitrate will be held unenforceable."'" The
Court, citing Wilko, 89 also noted that if Congress intended the pro15 U.S.C. § 15a et seq. (1986).
, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 105 S. Ct.
3346 (1985). Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, a Puerto Rican corporation, entered into a sales
agreement with Mitsubishi as a distributor of the firm's automobiles. The sales agreement
provided for arbitration by the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association of disputes arising under the agreement. The Court did not address the validity of the American Safety
doctrine as applied to domestic transactions, but instead focused on the international nature of the transaction, concluding that as in Scherk, the "need for predictability in the
resolution of disputes" arising under an international transaction required enforcement,
even if under a domestic transaction the Court would hold arbitration clauses unenforceable. 105 S. Ct. at 3355.
" Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3353-54. The Arbitration Act does require that claims arising
under statutes be expressly included with the arbitration clause of the agreement. 105 S.
Ct. at 3353.
" American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.
1968) (specific anti-trust claims held inappropriate for arbitration).
" Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3349. Mitsubishi, a manufacturer of automobiles, is incorporated in Tokyo, Japan. Soler is a Puerto Rican Corporation. Soler agreed, as a distributor,
to sell Mitsubishi automobiles in a designated area of Puerto Rico. Id.
e Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
" Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3355-56. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. at 51520. See also The Bremen v. Zaputo Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13 (1972) (parochial view of
international trade will discourage commerce with American companies).
8' Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3361. See also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S.
1, 10
(1984) (Arbitration Act evinces national policy favoring arbitration); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (enactment of Arbitration Act
evidence of a congressional declaration of federal policy favoring arbitration); Wilko v.
Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953) (Act establishes desirability of arbitration as a viable alternative to litigation).
w Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3355.
" Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427.
-
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tection afforded by a statute to include non-waiver of a judicial
forum, it would be either express, or deducible from the text or
the legislative history,90 as it is with the Securities Act of 1934.91
Although upholding the arbitrability of the claims, the Court
indicated that when congressional intention expresses that a claim
be litigated only in a judicial forum, the arbitration agreement
should not be enforced."
Acting on this suggestion by the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, in McMahon v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc.,' applied the Wilko" holding to the 1934 Act,
thereby reaffirming the Second Circuit's continued belief in its
validity.' 5
C. McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.
In McMahon," the appellants alleged that Shearson had violated
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act by "churning [their] accounts, making false statements and omitting material facts" when advising
them.'7 In addition, appellants also alleged a RICO claim and
state law claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duties.' 8 The
Court distinguished McMahon" from ByrdE on the facts, since
Shearson, unlike Dean Witter in Byrd,10 1 sought to compel arbitration of the federal claims under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.102

Noting the similarities between the language of the non-waiver
"Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3355. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 430, 435.
" Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3355.

788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
McMahon, 788 F.2d at 96-97 (2d Cir. 1986); see AFP Imaging Corp. v. Rosa, 780 F.2d
202, 205 (2d Cir. 1985): Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 436-37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
432 U.S. 910 (1977): Greater Continental Corp. v. Schechter, 422 F.2d 1100, 1103 (2d
Cir. 1970): Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 183 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 817 (1966).
" McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,
107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
" 107 S. Ct. at 96.
Si
'

"Id.
'

McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986).
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).

10 Id.

"' McMahon, 788 F.2d at 96-98.
'0 Id. at 98.
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provisions of both the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the public policy concerns as indicated by the legislative history of the Acts, and the
clear judicial precedent, the court held that "the orderly administration of justice will best be served"10 3 if Section 10(b) claims are
held non-arbitrable under the 1934 Act.'"
II.

THE EXTENSION OF THE

Wilko

RULE

In granting certiorari in McMahon, 0 ' the Supreme Court has
acknowledged the disparity in the lower federal court holdings in
regard to the arbitrability of fraud violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1 It is submitted that the decision in Wilko v.
Swan,10 7 holding fraud violations of the Securities Act of 1933
non-arbitrable, should be extended to the 1934 Act because of
the strong federal policy in favor of determining such claims in
federal court as demonstrated by the non-waiver provisions of the
1934 Act and by congressional intent.
In examining the statutes, the logical provisions with which to
begin the query are the non-waiver provisions.'" One distinction
between the two acts that could affect the outcome of the decision
is the right to a private cause of action found explicitly in Section
I
ld.
788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
105 Compare DeLancie v. Birr, Wilson & Co., 648 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1981) (decided in
favor of judicial proceeding to settle dispute): Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598
F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979) (same): Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore,
590 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1978) (same): Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. 558 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1977) (same): and Colonial Realty v. Bache & Co., 358
F.2d 178 (2d Cir.) (same), cert denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966) with Jarvis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 1146 (D. Vt. 1985) (decided in favor of arbitration); Finkle & Ross
v. A.G. Becker Paribas Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1505 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (same); Intre Sport Ltd. v.
Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 625 F. Supp. 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (same): Hanes Corp. v.
Millard, 531 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (same); Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942) (same).
10s 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
107 See Securities Exchange Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 14, 48 (1933) Stat. 74, 84 (codified as
amended in 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982)) which provides that -[a]ny condition, stipulation, or
provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision
of this sub-chapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void." Id. See
also Colonial Realty v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 183 n.5 (2d Cir.) ("the non-waiver
provision of the 1933 Act has an almost identical counterpart in Section 29(a) of the 1934
Act"), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
10 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38 § 12, 48 Stat. 74, 84 (1933) (codified as amended in 15
U.S.C. § 77(n) (1982)).
104
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12 of the 1933 Act.'" Although this right is not expressly found
in the 1934 Act, it has been consistently recognized as implied
under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.1 10
With the existence of this "special right" in the 1934 Act firmly
established, it is now necessary to look into the purposes of the
statutes involved. Although it is recognized that the purposes underlying the enactment of the Arbitration Act are important,"' it
is suggested that the countervailing policy of protecting the investor inherent in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prevail. From
this basic purpose, found in both the 1933 and 1934 Acts, it may
be inferred that Congress intended the protective non-waiver provision of the 1933 Act to apply to both Acts with respect to the
availability of a judicial forum for aggrieved investors. 1 In addition to any congressional intent that may be inferred from the
purpose of the Acts, Congress has expressly refused to disrupt the
existing law as expounded in Wilko v. Swan, in the context of
amending portions of the 1934 Act."'
In addition to the legislative intent of Congress, it is submitted
that the nature of arbitration proceedings themselves leads to the
'" See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) ("The existence of
this implied remedy is simply beyond peradventure."): Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 196 (1976) (existence of private cause of action now well established).
This implied private right of action was recognized for the first time in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The Supreme Court accepted this
implied right the first time it was brought before the Court, and did so with barely a discussion. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431-32 (1953) (discussing the positive aspects of
arbitration).
' See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431 (Securities Act enacted to protect individual investor, and
as such, statute should be construed to achieve that purpose); Otis and Co. v. SEC, 106 F.2d
579, 583 (6th Cir. 1939) (same); Oklahoma Texas Trust v. SEC, 100 F.2d 888, 891 (10th
Cir. 1939).
1I See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 525 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting),
in which Justice Douglas, citing Wilko, 346 U.S. at 437, stated that "[als the protective
provisions of the Securities Act require the exercise of judicial direction, it seems to us that
Congress must have intended Section 14 . . .to apply to waiver of judicial trial and review." Scherk, 417 U.S. at 525.
"' When amending the arbitration provisions of the 1934 Act, the Conference Committee stated "lilt was the clear understanding of the conferees that this amendment did not
change existing law, as articulated in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), concerning the
effect of arbitration proceeding provisions in agreements entered into by persons dealing
with members.., of self-regulatory organizations." H.R. CoNy. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong.,
Ist
Sess. III,
reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMtiN. NEWS 321, 342. Congress thereby
clearly indicated it believed that the investor's right to avoid arbitration extended to the
1934 Act as well. Id.
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conclusion that claims of fraud violations of the Securities Ex-

change Act of 1934 made by investors against brokers are more
properly litigated in federal courts than by arbitrators. Therefore,
it is suggested that when the Supreme Court hears McMahon,11 4 it
should affirm the court of appeals decision, extending Wilko11 ' to
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, holding federal securities
claims by investors against brokers non-arbitrable unless the investor agrees to arbitration after the claim arises.
CONCLUSION

The question of whether or not to extend the Wilko rule to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 has led to disparity within the
lower federal courts. The Supreme Court, in granting certiorari
in McMahon, has an opportunity to extend the Wilko rule to the
1934 Act. Based on the similarities in the language and purpose
of both Acts, legislative intent and public policy, Wilko should be
extended.
Roslyn A. Quarto & George Boss

MMcMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,
107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
"I Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).

